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Abstract
This paper studies empirically how uncertainty a¤ects speculation in the foreign ex-
change markets. We use the dispersion of survey forecasts of key macroeconomic variables
to measure uncertainty about fundamentals. We nd that uncertainty has a non-monotone
e¤ect on exchange rate pressures: namely, uncertainty heightens speculative pressures when
expected fundamentals are good and eases them when they are bad. We prove that this
prediction arises from a broad class of currency crisis theories, ranging from rst-generation
to global-game models. We also show that the proposed empirical strategy remains valid
in the presence of forecasters with strategic objectives and use a novel set of instrumental
variables to address potential endogeneity bias.
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1 Introduction
Recent theoretical contributions to the currency crisis literature have turned the spotlight on
the role of uncertainty during crises, showing that the same fundamentals may or may not lead
to a speculative attack depending on the precision of information about them. The matter is
also critical for policy purposes. For example, if greater uncertainty increases the probability
of a speculative attack, then exchange rate regimes will be more vulnerable in periods of high
uncertainty and policy-makers should adjust their policies accordingly. There has been little
debate, however, about the empirical signicance of uncertainty about fundamentals during
currency crises. This paper analyzes this question by proceeding in two stages.
First, we show that a broad class of currency crisis theories with a unique equilibrium
 ranging from rst-generation models with public information (such as those pioneered
by Krugman, 1979, and Flood and Garber, 1984) to global games with public and private
information (see Morris and Shin, 1998, and Hellwig, 2002)  predicts that the e¤ect of
uncertainty on exchange rate pressures is non-monotone and varies with expected funda-
mentals.1 Specically, these models predict that, when expected fundamentals are good,a
reduction in information precision (i.e. an increase in uncertainty) raises the share of specula-
tors attacking the currency, whereas a reduction in information precision with badexpected
fundamentals has the opposite e¤ect. This broad-based prediction  which previous studies
have overlooked  has a very intuitive interpretation: as information about fundamentals
becomes less precise, speculators rely less on it in order to decide whether to attack the cur-
rency. Thus, as information about bad fundamentals becomes less reliable, speculators lose
condence in the success of a speculative attack and diminish exchange rate pressures. By
the same token, as information about good fundamentals becomes less reliable, speculators
lose condence in the good state of the economy and augment exchange rate pressures.2
Second, we study empirically how speculation in the foreign exchange markets is af-
fected by uncertainty about fundamentals, by measuring the latter with the dispersion of
survey forecasts of key macroeconomic variables in six Asian countries.3 Survey forecasts
are an appealing source of information to test models in which exchange rate pressures de-
pend on agents beliefs about fundamentals. Since 1995, for the six Asian countries in our
1For rst-generation models, we derive our results from a framework that nests the models of Grilli (1986)
and Goldberg (1991). For global games, we consider the framework analyzed by Hellwig (2002), Metz (2002),
and Morris and Shin (2004).
2 It should be clear that we do not attempt to discriminate between rst-generation and global-game models,
but we study the role of uncertainty by encompassing di¤erent models. On the former matter, our results
suggest, if anything, that in order to discriminate between di¤erent currency crisis models, one cannot look
at their implications about the role of uncertainty, which are essentially the same across models.
3The countries in our sample are: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand.
Data are monthly and cover the period from January 1995 to April 2005.
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sample, Consensus Economics has gathered individual forecasts from a panel of analysts in-
cluding both international nancial rms and domestic enterprises at a monthly frequency
 a higher frequency than that of some key macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth.
Survey forecasts are also inherently forward looking, just like the exchange rate pressures that
the currency crisis literature tries to explain. Moreover, it is possible to relate the mean and
variance of the individual forecasts to, respectively, expected fundamentals and the precision
of information, which are the key parameters of currency crisis models.
The main challenge we face in studying empirically the e¤ect of uncertainty on exchange
rate pressures is that causality could go both ways. While currency crisis theories predict a
causal e¤ect from the mean and variance of the forecasts to exchange rate pressures, shocks
to unobservable determinants of exchange rate pressures can also a¤ect the distribution of
the forecasts.
We tease out this complex interaction by building a novel set of instrumental variables.
Our instruments include the level and dispersion of forecasts of consumption growth and the
unemployment rate in the United States, as well as alternative composite instruments com-
puted as the trade-weighted version of the same macroeconomic indicators for G-6 countries
(i.e., the G-7 countries without Japan).
Are these valid instruments for GDP growth forecasts of Asian countries? The ideal
instrument is an external source of variation that randomly changes the mean and variance of
the GDP growth forecasts of Asian countries, in a manner that is uncorrelated with the unob-
servable determinants of exchange rate pressures. Forecasts of domestic demand conditions
in the United States (or in G-6 countries) satisfy the requirement of being positively corre-
lated with GDP growth forecasts of Asian countries, because the export-oriented economies
of the latter depend on cyclical conditions in the former. Moreover, our proposed instruments
are exogenous to speculative pressures in Asian countries since they reect mostly domestic
factors in the United States, on which exchange rate developments in Asian countries have a
negligible e¤ect.
These two characteristics, however, are not su¢ cient to fully justify the use of fore-
casts of domestic demand conditions in the United States as instruments for GDP growth
forecasts of Asian countries. The additional identifying assumption which is required is that
our instruments have no reason to be included as regressors in the second stage of the IV
estimation.4 In other words, we need to assume that forecasts of domestic demand conditions
in the United States only a¤ect exchange rate pressures in Asian countries indirectly, i.e. by
modifying these countriesGDP growth forecasts. We justify this exclusion restriction by
including forecasts of U.S. interest rates, as well as their interaction with lagged levels of
4This exclusion restriction is critical because, if domestic demand conditions in G-6 countries needed to
be included in the second stage and we omitted them, our instruments would be correlated with the residual
unobservable determinant of exchange rate pressures.
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short-term debt in each Asian country. These variables aim at capturing changes in nancial
market conditions in the United States that might a¤ect exchange rate pressures in Asian
countries  for example, through higher expected costs of servicing their external debt 
and that our instruments might proxy. Then, our identifying assumption is that, after con-
trolling for U.S. interest rates and their interaction with Asian countriesshort-term external
debt, forecasts of domestic demand conditions in the United States do not have any residual
direct e¤ect on Asian countriesexchange rate pressures.
Using IV estimates is very important also to address another problem that could po-
tentially a¤ect our analysis. The mean forecasts is only an imperfect measure of expected
fundamentals (think, for instance, at the sample error due to the fact that we observe only
a nite number of forecasters). Therefore, in a multivariate specication like the one that is
predicted by the theory, OLS would provide biased estimates of all coe¢ cients (in a direction
that is di¢ cult to assess), including also the coe¢ cient related to uncertainty, which is the
main variable we are interested in. Instrumental variables, then, are our main weapon to
address this second problem as well.
Table 1 presents some preliminary evidence about the e¤ect of uncertainty on exchange
rate pressures. The north-west panel of the table shows that, when GDP growth forecasts are
bad, high uncertainty is associated with low exchange rate pressures.5 Conversely, the north-
east panel of the table shows that, when GDP growth forecasts are good, high uncertainty
is associated with high exchange rate pressures. Both ndings are consistent with the non-
monotone e¤ect predicted by the theory that uncertainty heightens speculative pressures
when expected fundamentals are good and eases them when they are bad. These results,
which are conrmed by simple OLS regressions, are corroborated by our IV estimates, as
well as by an extensive set of robustness checks.
There are relatively few studies in the empirical literature on currency crises that have
focused on the role of uncertainty. Early exceptions are Hodrik (1989), who unsuccessfully
used estimated conditional variances of money supply, industrial production, and consumer
prices, to account for the dynamics of the forward exchange-rate premium; and Kaminsky and
Peruga (1990), who estimated a GARCH-in-Mean restricted VAR model. Our paper di¤ers
from these studies for the novel testable prediction derived from a broad class of currency
crisis theories with a unique equilibrium and the use of survey data.
5 In Table 1, the thresholds separating good from bad expected fundamentals and high from low uncer-
tainty are, respectively, the median value of GDP growth forecasts and the median value of the variance of
GDP growth forecasts. In our regressions, however, the threshold separating good from bad fundamentals is
estimated (while no threshold is needed for the variance). Following Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996),
our measure of exchange rate pressures is a weighted average of changes in the exchange rate, changes in
international reserves which can be paid out in responding to pressures, and changes in the domestic interest
rates (since interest rates can be raised to fend o¤ an attack). Section 3 explains in detail the construction of
this variable. We thank Jonathan Eaton for the suggestion of including this table in the paper.
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More recently, Bloom, Floetotto, and Jaimovich (2009) have documented that un-
certainty, as measured by the volatility of several micro and macro economic variables, is
countercyclical. Interestingly, these ndings, coupled with ours, imply that changes in un-
certainty contribute to make exchange rate pressures less cyclical. Thus, an intriguing result
from this analysis is that, for what concerns speculative pressures, the e¤ect of uncertainty
is not as bad as it is generally thought.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the testable implications
on the role of uncertainty and expected fundamentals that we derive from both rst-generation
and global-game models. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 illustrates the empirical
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical underpinnings
To analyze the role of uncertainty during currency crises, we estimate variants of the following
equation:
ERP = 0 + 1y + 2(y   ) + " , (1)
where ERP is an index of the speculative pressures, y represents the expected fundamentals,
 is a measure of uncertainty,  is a threshold separating good from bad expected fundamen-
tals, and " is a residual. The most important feature of equation (1) is that it allows for a
non-monotonic e¤ect of uncertainty: this e¤ect is, in fact, assumed to depend on the level
of expected fundamentals. Hence, for instance, if 2 > 0 (as the theory predicts), higher
uncertainty will augment pressures on the exchange rate only for su¢ ciently good expecta-
tions (y > ). Conversely, higher uncertainty will attenuate exchange rate pressures with
bad expectations (y < ).
In principle, one could think that higher uncertainty always encourages speculative
attacks.6 The purpose of this section is to show, instead, that a non-monotonic e¤ect of
uncertainty emerges in both rst-generation models with public information and global games
with public and private information. These models, which share the key feature of yielding a
unique equilibrium, allow us to derive exact comparative statics results and to bring to light
the e¤ects of expected fundamentals and uncertainty reected in equation (1).7
6For example, uncertainty has a negative e¤ect on aggregate output and employment in the micro model
of the rm of Bloom (2009) as well as in the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium macro model of Bloom,
Floetotto, and Jaimovich (2009). In the currency crisis literature, Flood and Marion (2000) build a model with
multiple equilibria in which higher uncertainty about a real shock raises the risk premium on asset holdings,
then expected fundamentals deteriorate, moving the economy to a region where a self-fullling attack may
occur. Similarly, uncertainty seems to have a negative e¤ect in Flood and Garber (1984), because their
model assumes an exponential distribution of fundamentals in which the e¤ect of higher uncertainty cannot
be distinguished from the e¤ect of deteriorating expected fundamentals.
7Second generation models of currency crisis à la Obstfeld (1996) are not suitable to analyze the role of
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2.1 Krugman-Flood-Garber models
Following Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984), rst-generation models consider
dynamic settings with deteriorating fundamentals, usually represented by excessively increas-
ing money supply. These models build on three key equations: the uncovered interest rates
parity (UIP), the purchasing power parity (PPP), and the money market equilibrium condi-
tion (MME)  an equation in which, in its simplest form, real money supply is a function
of nominal interest rates (see Appendix A for analytic details).
The exchange rate, dened in terms of units of domestic currency per one unit of foreign
currency, is xed by public authorities at a peg e. A speculative attack is assumed to occur
as soon as speculators can earn positive expected prots from a devaluation (thus, neglecting
possible coordination problems, which are the focus of other models). Positive expected
prots, in turn, are obtained whenever the expected shadow exchange rate  dened as
the exchange rate that would prevail after the devaluation  becomes larger than the peg.
Hence, at time t, the probability of a speculative attack is Pr (et+1 > e), where et+1 is the
expected shadow exchange rate at time t + 1. In Appendix A we show that, taking into
account the three key equations, this probability translates into:
Pr (t+1  kt) , (2)
where t+1 is random variable representing the stochastic component of the fundamentals
at time t+ 1, and kt 2 R gathers all the constants and the components of the fundamentals
whose values are known at time t. The signs of the variables are chosen so that a decrease in
t+1 and an increase in kt correspond to deteriorating fundamentals.
Various rst-generation models di¤er only in the specication of t+1 and kt. In Flood
and Garber (1984), t+1 is a stochastic shock to the money supply at time t + 1; kt is a
function of the time-t levels of international interest rates, foreign prices, the exchange-rate
peg, the domestic credit, its drift, and the lower bound for international reserves (usually set
to 0). Similarly, Grilli (1986) gathers all the fundamentals into a variable ht, which follows
an AR (1) process with some positive drift; then, t+1 is the stochastic shock of this process
at time t + 1, while kt includes the variables considered by Flood and Garber (1984), plus
the sensitivity of money demand to the exogenous real domestic income.8
uncertainty because they typically assume complete information and they yield multiple equilibria, reducing
the possibilities to derive precise comparative statics results. Sbracia and Zaghini (2001) and Prati and
Sbracia (2010), however, consider incomplete information extensions of these models and show that they yield
predictions about the space of parameters in which a speculative attack is feasible that are consistent with
the predictions analyzed in this section.
8Goldberg (1991) generalizes all three key equations: the UIP, by considering a risk premium; the PPP,
by introducing non-traded goods, and systematic and random deviations from PPP; the MME, by adding a
currency substitution motive to money demand. In her model, t+1 is a linear function of three independent
random variables: the stochastic deviations from PPP, the shocks to domestic credit (to nance unanticipated
government expenditure), and the uncertain availability of external credit.
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As in Grilli (1986), we assume that t+1  Norm(y; 1=), i.e. that t+1 is normally
distributed with mean y 2 R and variance 1=, where  > 0.9 Since this distribution
is common knowledge, we can regard it as the public information available to speculators.
Thus, we can refer to the expected fundamental y as the "public signal" and to  as the
"precision of public information."
The probability of a speculative attack can be written as  [
p
 (kt   y)], where  is the
cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the standard normal distribution. By di¤erentiating,
it is immediate to show the following result:
Proposition 1 The probability of a speculative attack, Pr (t+1  kt), is: (i) decreasing in
y; (ii) decreasing (increasing) in  if y > kt (y < kt).
The proposition shows that the probability of a speculative attack is always reduced
by an improvement in expected fundamentals. The most striking result, however, is that the
e¤ect of the precision of public information depends on the level of expected fundamentals.
Specically, if y is su¢ ciently good (i.e. y > kt), then an increase in  diminishes the
probability of a currency crisis, and vice versa if y is su¢ ciently bad (y < kt). Before
providing some intuition, we discuss the extension of this result to other distributions and,
in the next section, we show that this prediction is also shared by another class of currency
crisis models.
Throughout the paper, we use the normality assumption for two main reasons. First,
to maintain consistency across models, as global games with public and private information
can be easily solved with normal distributions. Second, because when we test the normality
assumption of the survey forecasts that we use in the empirical analysis, we cannot reject it
at the standard 5 percent threshold. Nonetheless, the possibility of collapsing rst-generation
models into an equation as simple as (2) allows for a straightforward generalization of the
main results to non-normal distributions. Assume that t+1 is a random variable with a
location parameter l and a scale parameter s, and denote its cdf by F (; l; s). The denitions
of l and s (which, in the normal distribution, correspond to the mean and the standard
deviation) imply that: F (; l; s) = F
 
 l
s ; 0; 1

. Note that the scale parameter is the inverse
of the precision parameter. Hence, we can set 1=s = , where  denotes the precision, so
that the probability of a speculative attack becomes: Pr (t+1 < kt; l; ) = F ( (kt   l) ; 0; 1).
By the properties of distribution functions, it immediately follows that the probability of a
speculative attack is decreasing in the location parameter l, and decreasing (increasing) in
the precision parameter  if l > kt (l < kt), generalizing Proposition 1.
9First-generation models usually set y = 0, as they gather into kt all the constants (including the drift of
the stochastic process driving the fundamentals).
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2.2 Morris-Shin models
Morris and Shin (1998, 2004) and Hellwig (2002) modify the previous framework along three
main dimensions. First, following Obstfeld (1996), they introduce a coordination problem:
for some range of fundamentals, only a coordinated attack can force the government to
abandon the peg; as a result, complete information about fundamentals would yield multiple
equilibria. Second, they show that an incomplete-information version of the model with public
and private information about fundamentals yields a unique equilibrium if private signals are
su¢ ciently precise relative to public signals. Third, in order to focus on coordination and
information issues, they replace the dynamic setting with a simpler static one.
To model strategic complementarities, Morris and Shin assume that public authorities
devalue the currency whenever the share of attackers, l 2 [0; 1], is larger than the fundamental
. Payo¤s are as follow: agents who successfully attack the currency peg obtain a net payo¤
D   > 0, where  > 0 is a transaction cost; unsuccessful attacks pay the cost   ; refraining
from attacking provides 0. This complete-information problem yields a tripartition of the
space of fundamentals: if  2 ( 1; 0], the government abandons the peg; if  2 (1;+1),
the government maintains the peg; if  2 (0; 1], there are multiple equilibria: speculators can
either attack the currency and force a devaluation, or refrain from attacking and allow the
peg to be maintained.
Now assume that agents do not observe  before deciding whether to attack and, as in
the previous section, take a normal distribution of the fundamentals,   Norm(y; 1=). As-
sume also that each speculator i receives a private signal xi = +"i, with "i  Norm(0; 1=)
(with "i and "j independent given  for each i 6= j), where  > 0 is the precision of private
information. It is possible to show that this model yields a unique equilibrium if   2=2
(Morris and Shin, 2004). This equilibrium consists of a unique value of the private signal
x such that each speculator receiving a signal lower than x attacks the currency peg (trig-
ger strategy), and a unique level of the fundamentals  2 [0; 1] such that the government
abandons the peg when fundamentals are lower than .10
The equilibrium trigger points  and x are both functions of y, , and . Thus,
speculatorsexpectations matter and one can derive rigorous comparative statics about their
e¤ects on the trigger points  and x. Most importantly, it is possible to calculate the
e¤ects of the parameters on the probability that speculator i attacks, Pr(Xi  x j ). This
probability represents the share of speculators attacking the currency and, therefore, has a
straightforward empirical counterpart in an index of exchange rate pressure.
10The original Morris-Shin game has been subject to several extensions, encompassing other distributions
(Heinemann and Illing, 2002) and "large" speculators (Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin, 2004). Many
studies (such as Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan, 2003, and Tarashev, 2007) have focused on modications of
the model that restore multiplicity of equilibria, such as the introduction of signalling by central banks and
the information-aggregation role of interest rates.
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The share of speculators attacking the currency is equal to 
p
 (x   ). This
probability depends on the actual fundamental  and on the parameters y and  (which
a¤ect x) and  (which is in the argument of  and also a¤ects x). In Appendix B, we show
the following result:
Proposition 2 Assume that   22 ; then the probability Pr(Xi  x j ) is: (i) decreasing
in y; (ii) decreasing (increasing) in  if y > s1 (y < s1), where s1 2 R; (iii) decreasing
(increasing) in  if  > s2 ( < s2), where s2 is a function of y.11
As in rst-generation models, an improvement in expected fundamentals always reduces
the share of speculators attacking the currency (point ( i) of Proposition 2). Similarly, the
e¤ect of the precision of public information depends on expected fundamentals (point ( ii)):
when y is su¢ ciently good, an increase in  strengthens the belief that fundamentals are
good and reduces the share of attacking speculators by decreasing the equilibrium trigger
point x (and vice versa when y is bad).
The e¤ect of changes in the precision of private information  on the share of attackers
is more complex. This e¤ect depends not only on the expected fundamental y but also on the
realized fundamental , around which the signals xi are centered. Two forces are at work.
First, there is an e¤ect of  which is opposite to the e¤ect of , due to the fact that the ex-post
expected fundamental of agent i is a weighted average of y and xi with weights respectively
equal to  and . If y is high, speculators expect good fundamentals. Then, if the precision
ratio = is high (low), speculators know that also the other speculators have formed their
expectations attributing a large (small) weight to the good public signal; then, they will be
less (more) inclined to attack the currency. In other words, coordination on a good public
signal is easier (harder) when the public component y in each individual expectation carries
a large (small) weight. On the contrary, for a low y, a low ratio = tends to reduce the share
of attackers because agents regard that bad public signal as less reliable; by the same token,
a high ratio = raises the share of attackers for the opposite reason.
A higher , however, has also the additional e¤ect of concentrating the private signals
around the actual fundamental . This e¤ect can either o¤set or reinforce the rst one,
depending on the realization of . Suppose y is good. If the realized  is also good, the
number of signals below the threshold x may diminish enough to o¤set the e¤ect of a higher
x (due to the increase in  when y is good); as a result, the share of attackers decreases
following the increase in . In this case,  has the same e¤ect as . If the realized fundamental
 is, instead, bad, the second e¤ect reinforces the rst and the share of attacking speculators
increases; i.e.  and  have opposite e¤ects. When we consider the polar case in which y
is bad, we have symmetric results. In particular, if the realized fundamental  is also bad,
11Exact expressions of s1 and s2 are in Appendix B.
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the e¤ect of the greater concentration of the private signals around  may dominate and the
share of attackers increases, as in the case of an increase in .
Thus, changes in the precision of private information tend to have the same e¤ect
as changes in the precision of public information, provided that the average private signal
(i.e., the actual fundamental) and the public signal (the ex-ante expected fundamental) are
either both su¢ ciently good or both su¢ ciently bad. Instead, if the o¤setting e¤ect of actual
fundamentals is not su¢ ciently strong, then the precision of private information has e¤ects
that are opposite to those of public information.12
2.3 Testable implications
What are the empirical implications of the models discussed above for the signs of 1 and 2
in equation (1)? Clearly, both rst-generation and global-game models predict that an im-
provement in expected fundamentals, y, eases the pressures on the exchange rate. Therefore,
we expect 1 to be negative.
Now suppose that the measure of uncertainty  reects the inverse of the precisions of
public and private information (as shown in Appendix C). If  increases (i.e.  decreases)
with good expected fundamentals (y > ), then both models predict that exchange rate
pressures decline. Therefore, theoretical models imply 2 > 0. Similarly, if  increases with
bad expected fundamentals (y < ), then exchange rate pressures rise. Hence, we still expect
2 > 0. Obviously, in the mirror cases where  diminishes, the implications for exchange rate
pressures are opposite, so that the e¤ect of  always implies 2 > 0.
The e¤ect of an increase in  can be derived from the global-game model. If  changes
and actual and expected fundamentals are both su¢ ciently good or both su¢ ciently bad,
then the e¤ect of  is the same as the e¤ect of , thereby implying 2 > 0. Hence, while
there are very good reasons to expect 2 > 0, we cannot completely rule out the possibility
of a negative sign, because we do not have separate observations for  and . Thus, it might
be 2 < 0 if a change in  is due to a change in  with a low y and a high , or vice versa.
12While a generalization of the Morris-Shin model is beyond the scope of this paper, we can o¤er some
hints on the possibility of extending Proposition 2 to other distributions. Consider a variable Xi with location
parameter l (the actual fundamental with the normality assumption), precision parameter  (the precision of
private information), and cdf F (; l; ) and assume that the model yields a unique equilibrium trigger point
x, so that F (x; l; ) is the share of attackers. In the equilibrium, x changes not only with the precision
of private information , but also with expected fundamentals y and the precision of public information 
(y and  being the parameters of the prior). If, as it is reasonable, @x=@y < 0 (i.e. the trigger point for
attacking the currency decreases as expected fundamentals improve), then part (i) of Proposition 2 holds.
Analogously, note that @F (x; l; s) =@ has the same sign as @x=@, while @F (x; l; s) =@ has the same
sign as
h
(x   l) +  @x
@
i
. These results, when compared with equations (12) and (13), suggest that the same
non-monotone e¤ects of uncertainty found for normal distributions also hold for other distributions.
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In these situations, the expected sign depends on which of the two e¤ects described above
prevails (namely, that of = as relative weight of y versus that of 1= as dispersion of the
private signals around ).
3 The data
To estimate variants of equation (1), we need to measure exchange rate pressures, nd the
empirical counterparts of y and , build the necessary instruments, and include other controls
that are typically considered in empirical studies of currency crises. In this section, we
describe all these variables.
3.1 Indices of speculative pressure
To measure the fraction of speculators that decide to attack the currency, we build an index of
exchange rate pressure.13 Previous empirical studies have generally used continuous indices of
exchange rate pressure as an intermediate step towards the construction of a binary zero-one
variable corresponding to tranquil and crisis periods. In this paper, we use the underlying
continuous index of exchange rate pressure directly as a dependent variable. The aim is
to have an empirical approach that encompasses the private information models considered
in this paper, where some speculators attack the currency while others do not, so that the
number of attackers varies continuously with fundamentals and agentsbeliefs. This approach
makes sense as, in reality, di¤erent groups of agents may take opposite positions against any
given currency.
Our index of exchange rate pressure IND3 is the sum of the normalized values of three
indicators:14 (i) the percentage depreciation of the domestic currency against the U.S. dollar
over the previous month; (ii) the fall in international reserves over the previous month as
a percentage of the 12-month moving average of imports; and (iii) the three-month interest
rate less the annualized percentage change in consumer prices over the previous six months.15
13Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) rst developed empirical indices of exchange rate pressures, whose
theoretical foundations lie in monetary models of optimal exchange-rate-market intervention.
14To normalize, we subtract from each indicator the country-specic mean and divide the result by the
country-specic standard deviation.
15To check the robustness of our results, we also compute two other indexes. An index IND2, which sums
only normalized values of the indicators (i) and (ii) and a second index BIS, which is the continuous version
of an index developed by the Bank for International Settlements also based on changes in exchange rates,
international reserves, and real interest rates (see Hawkins and Klau, 2000). In the rest of the paper, we
present estimation results for IND3; those for IND2 and BIS, which are very similar, are reported in Prati
and Sbracia (2002).
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3.2 Survey forecasts of domestic macroeconomic variables
Every month, Consensus Economics gathers forecasts of a series of macroeconomic variables
for the current and the following year. The panel of forecasters encompasses most interna-
tional big players in the foreign exchange market as well as domestic enterprises. The former
group includes both large banks such as Citigroup, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Barclays, UBS,
ING Bank, ABN AMRO and important non-banking nancial institutions such as Goldman
Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley. The number of forecasters
surveyed by Consensus Economics varies across countries and over time; its average for each
of the six countries in our sample ranges between 14 and 18 and was slightly larger in 1997.
To reproduce a constant forecast horizon of one year, we follow Brooks, Edison, Kumar,
and Sløk (2004) and compute a weighted average of current-year and following-year forecasts
with weights equal respectively to 11/12 and 1/12 in January, 10/12 and 2/12 in February,
and so on until 0/12 and 12/12 in December.16 Appendix C shows the link between the
mean forecast and expected fundamentals, and between the variance of the forecasts and the
precision of public and private information. To reduce the e¤ect of possible outliers, we use
the median (rather than the mean) of Consensus Economics forecasts at each date and the
mean absolute median di¤erence as a measure of dispersion.17
3.3 Instrumental variables
To address possible endogeneity bias, we create a novel set of instrumental variables. These
are the level and dispersion of forecasts of consumption growth and the unemployment rate
in the United States, as well as an alternative composite instrument computed as the trade-
weighted version of the same variables for G-6 countries (i.e., the G-7 countries without
Japan). We use forecasts of consumption growth and the unemployment rate instead of GDP
growth forecasts to make our instruments as exogenous as possible to crisis events in Asian
countries, given that the export component of G-6 GDP might be partially a¤ected by the
16Multicollinearity of current-year and following-year forecasts prevents us from including both variables in
the regression. However, very similar results were obtained by including only the following-year forecast, only
the current-year forecast, or the following-year forecast together with the di¤erence between the two. In these
cases, the dispersion measures were seasonally adjusted to account for the smaller dispersion of forecasts 
documented by Loungani (2001)  at the end of each year than at the beginning of each year.
17Using the mean instead of the median forecast or using the standard deviation instead of the mean absolute
median di¤erence would provide essentially the same results. Consider that correlation between the mean and
the median forecast for our six countries is between 99.2 and 99.5 percent, while that between the standard
deviation and the mean absolute median di¤erence is only slightly lower. Figures 1 and 2 in Prati and Sbracia
(2002) show all the four variables for the six countries in our sample.
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economic crisis in Asia.18 Excluding Japan from the composite instrument is an additional
precaution aimed at ensuring its exogeneity in view of the somewhat greater dependence of
Japans economy on developments in neighboring Asia. Finally, the trade weights used to
construct the composite index are based on pre-crisis export shares over the period 1985-1994.
3.4 Other controls
In addition to survey forecasts of macroeconomic variables, we tried other regressors either
used in previous empirical studies on currency crises or suggested by the theoretical literature
(as reported also in Appendix D). Only three additional variables  the real exchange rate,
a forecast of U.S. interest rates, and the interaction between such forecast and BIS short-term
external debt  had a robust and signicant impact across specications and, therefore, were
included in the regressions.
The real e¤ective exchange (computed by JP Morgan Chase) had a better overall t
then the nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. There was no di¤erence between the
two models, however, in terms of the estimated signs and signicance of all other coe¢ cients.
Consensus Economics provides 3-month- and 12-month-ahead forecasts of 3-month U.S.
interest rates and 10-year U.S. treasury bond yields. Given that these four forecasts are highly
correlated, we tried each of them separately and selected the most signicant one (the 3-month
ahead forecast of 3-month rates). These forecasts were also superior to current U.S. interest
rates of various maturities, including the federal funds rate.
We capture the vulnerability associated with the combination of high U.S. interest
rates and high short-term external debt of most Asian countries with the interaction between
our preferred U.S. interest rate forecast and the ratio of BIS short-term external debt to
population (expressed in deviation from its country mean). This variable reects the non-
linear e¤ect of U.S. interest rates on speculative pressures, which is an increasing function of
short-term debt. Expressing short-term debt as a ratio to population rather than GDP gives
us a measure of indebtedness that uctuates mostly with short-term debt rather than with
GDP, which was very volatile during the crisis period. For the same reason, we do not scale
short-term debt with international reserves.
18Nonetheless, the small weight of exports in U.S. GDP combined with the small share of U.S. exports to
the six Asian countries in our study would make U.S. or G-6 GDP growth forecasts an instrument reasonably
exogenous to exchange rate pressures in Asian countries. IV regressions with U.S. or G-6 GDP-growth forecasts
used as instruments yield results similar to those we obtained using instruments based on consumption and
unemployment rate.
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4 Estimation results
This section presents estimation results for a simple baseline regression, our key instrumental
variable regressions, and a pre-crisis panel model. Appendix D reports additional robustness
tests based on a dynamic model (including a panel GMM specication), as well as models with
time-varying coe¢ cients and time-varying thresholds separating good from bad fundamentals.
4.1 Baseline regression
We estimate the following version of equation (1):
IND3j;t = ^0;j + ^1f
e
GDPj ;t 1 + ^2
e
GDPj ;t 1  (feGDPj ;t 1   ^jGDP )
+^3iUS;t 1 + ^4iUS;t 1  STj;t 1 + ^5;jej;t 1 + uj;t , (3)
with uj;t = ^juj;t 1 + "j;t
where IND3j;t is our three-component index of exchange rate pressure for country j at time
t, feGDPj ;t 1 is the median forecast of GDP growth, 
e
GDPj ;t 1 is the mean absolute median
di¤erence of GDP growth forecasts, iUS;t 1 is the 3-month ahead forecast of 3-month U.S.
interest rates, STj;t 1 is the ratio of short-term external debt to population of country j at
time t   1 expressed in deviation from country js average ratio over the sample, and ej;t 1
is the real e¤ective exchange rate.
First, we estimated this system as a set of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) with
country-specic coe¢ cients and a country-specic AR(1) term to correct for serial correla-
tion. We chose the SUR estimation method to allow for the likely correlation of the errors
across countries during the Asian crisis. Second, we performed a Wald test of equality of
parameters across countries, which showed that the coe¢ cients ^1; ^2; ^3; and ^4; could be
constrained to be the same across countries (the null hypothesis of equality was not rejected
with a p-value of 0.345). The rst six columns of Table 2 shows the results of this restricted
estimation of (3). We use the restrictions accepted by the data to simplify the presentation
and to conduct coherent robustness tests involving recursive estimation (see Appendix D) on
a specication with a small number of parameters. The restriction is by no means necessary
to obtain statistically signicant coe¢ cients: in the unrestricted estimates, all ^1;j were neg-
ative and statistically signicant at the 5 percent condence level and all ^2;j were positive
and statistically signicant at the 1 percent condence level.
The results reported in the rst six columns of Table 2 conrm that higher expected
GDP growth reduces exchange rate pressures (^1 < 0). Most interestingly, these estimates
indicate that uncertainty about GDP growth has an additional e¤ect, which depends on
expected GDP growth, as the theory predicts. A higher dispersion of GDP growth forecasts
increases exchange rate pressures when expected GDP growth is above the estimated country-
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specic threshold and reduces them when it is below (^2 > 0). Thresholds are statistically
di¤erent from zero only for Thailand (equal to 2.5 percent) and Malaysia (4 percent).
Two other results also stand out from this analysis. Uncertainty about GDP growth
appears to be the most important variable in our regression and provides the largest contri-
bution to the overall goodness-of-t of the model when it is interacted with expected GDP
growth, while when it is not interacted it remains signicant but its contribution to the over-
all goodness-of-t is much smaller. In particular, the contribution of the interaction term
to the overall goodness-of-t measure is larger than that of the median forecast alone: if we
exclude feGDPj ;t 1 by setting ^1 = 0 in (3), the R
2 for the overall system falls from 42.6 to
37.6 percent, whereas if we exclude eGDPj ;t 1  (feGDPj ;t 1   ^jGDP ) the R
2 for the overall
system drops from 42.6 to 33 percent. Adding back the dispersion of the forecasts eGDPj ;t 1
to the list of regressors without interacting it with (feGDPj ;t 1   ^jGDP ) yields an R
2 of only
34.3 percent.
The interaction between U.S. interest rates and short-term debt is strongly signicant
suggesting that global nancial conditions have an impact on speculative pressures through
the level of indebtedness of each country.19 An appreciated real exchange rate is also associ-
ated with higher speculative pressures in all countries except Hong Kong.
In this regression we have to worry about reverse causality from exchange rate pressures
to the distribution of GDP growth forecasts. In particular, one could easily think of a model
in which higher exchange rate pressures raise uncertainty about GDP growth forecasts.20 On
the other hand, it is di¢ cult to think of a model in which higher exchange rate pressures
lower uncertainty and, even more so, of a model in which higher exchange rate pressures lower
uncertainty when expected fundamentals are bad and raise them when expected fundamentals
are good. If causality went from exchange rate pressures to uncertainty, why should this
e¤ect depend on the level of GDP growth forecasts?21 While there are good reasons to think
that reverse causality is not the main driver of the previous results, in the next section we
address the causality issue directly, using instrumental variables. This method also allows
us to address possible omitted variable problems and the problem connected to the fact,
explained in Appendix C, that the mean and variance of the forecasts are imperfect measures
19Prati and Sbracia (2002) estimate also a "minimal" regression without additional controls like U.S. interest
rates and their interaction with short-term debt and show that ^1 and ^2 are still signicant and with the
predicted sign.
20Jeanne and Rose (2002) show, for example, that market expectations should be noisier under a oating
exchange rate regime.
21The focus on the theoretical mechanism through which uncertainty should a¤ect exchange rate pressures
as a way to make progress on the causality issue is akin to the approach of Rajan and Zingales (1998). These
authors use the theoretical prediction that nancial development should help disproportionately rms that
are more dependent on external nance for growth to shed light on the causal e¤ect of nancial development
on growth.
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of expected fundamentals and uncertainty about fundamentals.
4.2 Instrumental variable estimates
Lagging the mean and variance of the forecasts by one month  as we do in the baseline
regression  rules out contemporaneous reverse causality. Predetermined mean and variance
of the forecasts could, however, still be endogenous if a serially correlated omitted variable,
including a possible measurement error, a¤ected exchange rate pressures and the distribution
of the forecasts. In this case, lagged values of the mean and variance of the forecasts and the
error term would not be independent. We address this potential problem by instrumenting
feGDPj ;t 1 and 
e
GDPj ;t 1 with the median and absolute median di¤erence of the Consen-
sus forecasts of two macroeconomic variables, consumption growth and unemployment rate,
capturing cyclical domestic demand conditions in the United States and in G-6 countries.
The rationale for these instruments is threefold: (i) they are positively correlated with
GDP growth forecasts for Asian countries, whose export-oriented economies depend on cycli-
cal developments in G-6 countries; (ii) they are exogenous to speculative pressures in Asian
countries because they reect mostly domestic demand developments in G-6 countries; and
(iii) they can be excluded from the second-stage regressions because they are likely to a¤ect
exchange rate pressures in Asian countries only indirectly through Asian countriesGDP
growth forecasts. The third exclusion restriction requirement is satised on the grounds that
the presence among the regressors of the forecasts of U.S. interest rates and their interaction
with Asian countriesshort-term debt captures the impact of global nancial conditions on
speculative pressures. In other words, if we did not include these variables, our instruments
might have proxied them in view of their likely correlation with nancial conditions in the
United States through the Federal Reserves reaction function. For example, forecasters might
expect the Federal Reserve to raise U.S. interest rates in response to a forecasted tightening
of the U.S. labor market.
The rst six columns of Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the regressions with the
rst two instruments, the forecasts of consumption growth and of unemployment rate in the
United States. The estimated coe¢ cients ^1 and ^2, which are the focus of our study, remain
statistically signicant and with the expected sign. Results are broadly unchanged, however,
also for what concerns the other coe¢ cients. In particular, ^4 and ^5;j preserve the same sign
and similar p-values, while ^3, which was not signicant in the baseline regression, becomes
weakly signicant when the instruments are based on the forecasts of consumption growth
and strongly signicant when we use the forecasts of the unemployment rate.
Similarly, the rst six columns of Tables 5 and 6 conrm that all the coe¢ cients remain
largely unchanged when we instrument feGDPj ;t 1 and 
e
GDPj ;t 1 with the median and absolute
median di¤erence of the forecasts of consumption growth and unemployment rate in G-6
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countries. In particular, ^1 and ^2 are statistically signicant and with the expected sign
across all 3SLS estimates.
4.3 Pre-crisis panel model
Should we test the model predictions only on the pre-crisis sample? Prima facie, this would
seem the correct approach, because in the theoretical models the government pegs the ex-
change rate. Yet, there are institutional, empirical, and theoretical reasons why we should
test the model predictions on the entire sample.
From an institutional point of view, Hong Kong (which maintained its currency board)
and Singapore did not formally change their exchange rate regime during the crisis; in other
words, on a de jure basis, these countries never experienced an exchange rate crisis.22 On
the other hand, some countries that experienced a crisis on a de jure basis, like Indonesia,
South Korea, and Thailand, adopted a managed oat rather than a free oat as a post-crisis
regime; thus, they adopted an exchange rate regime whose features can still be captured by
the models of Section 2. Similarly, Malaysia repegged the exchange rate as early as September
1998, so that the period in which the currency oated was very short.
From an empirical point of view, countries that abandoned pegs battled for avoiding
large depreciations of their currencies well beyond July 1997 (the initial date of the crisis).
In fact, for all countries but South Korea, the largest outows of international reserves were
recorded in the second half of 1997, when they had already abandoned their pegs. In some
cases, the depletion of o¢ cial reserves continued in the rst quarter of 1998 and recurred
after the Russian crisis. These are signals that these countries tried to prevent a depreciation
of their currencies even after the collapse of the pre-crisis exchange rate regimes.
From a theoretical point of view, even in a oating exchange rate regime speculators face
a coordination problem: the future value of the currency and, in turn, their potential prots
depend on how many buy or sell the currency. Thus, each speculator still plays a coordination
game with the others that might result in a tripartition of the space of fundamentals similar
to that of the second-generation model analyzed in Section 2.2.23
These considerations suggest that the full-sample estimates of the rst six columns of
Tables 2 to 6 represent a meaningful test of the model. Nonetheless, it is still interesting to
22During the crisis, however, Singapore claimed to have broadened the undisclosed target band within which
the Singapore dollar was allowed to uctuate.
23Assume, for instance, there are values of the fundamentals that are so good that an appreciation is
certain, values that are so bad that a depreciation is certain, and values (maybe most values) for which the
outcome depends on how many speculators decide to buy or sell. Within this model, the mean and variance
of speculatorsexpectations would produce downward or upward pressures on the currency through the same
mechanism discussed for the other models considered in this paper.
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verify whether our results would change if we restricted the analysis to the pre-crisis period
1995:01-1997:07. The seventh column in Tables 2 to 6 shows the outcome of this exercise.
Because of the substantial reduction in the number of observations in this sample, we restrict
also ^j , ^5;j , and ^j to be the same across countries, allowing only the intercepts ^0;j in each
equation to be country-specic. This is equivalent to estimating a panel model with xed
e¤ects.
The non-monotone e¤ect of uncertainty is positive and statistically signicant in this
pre-crisis period as well. The negative e¤ect of better expected fundamentals on exchange
rate pressures is also conrmed. These results conrm that the breakdown of the exchange
rate regime in most of the countries in our panel in the second half of 1997 is not the sole
cause of the estimated e¤ect of uncertainty on exchange rate pressures.
We further checked the robustness of our results by re-estimating the full-sample model
of the rst six columns of Tables 2 to 6 with a set of step dummies set to 1 when a country
no longer pegged its exchange rate. The results were essentially unchanged, with ^1 and ^2
remaining very signicant. Nor did the results change when the pre-crisis panel model was
estimated on unbalanced panels excluding either the observations following the breakdown of
each countrys exchange rate regime or the observations following each countrys maximum
currency depreciation. Finally, the statistical signicance of the pre-crisis recursive estimates
of ^1 and ^2 (discussed in Appendix 3) provides another indication that our results also hold
in the pre-crisis sample.
5 Conclusions
Does uncertainty heighten or ease speculation in foreign exchange markets? Could the e¤ect
of uncertainty have di¤erent signs depending on the economic outlook? To analyze these
questions, we develop an empirical framework based on a broad class of currency crisis the-
ories with a unique equilibrium. As a rst contribution, we prove that both rst-generation
models with public information and global games with public and private information pre-
dict that uncertainty has a non-monotone e¤ect on speculative pressures; namely, uncertainty
heightens speculative pressures when expected fundamentals are good and eases them when
they are bad. By measuring expected fundamentals and uncertainty with the mean and
the dispersion of survey forecasts, we apply the proposed empirical framework to six Asian
countries, nding strong evidence of the non-monotone e¤ect of uncertainty predicted by the
theory. Instrumental variable estimates and several robustness tests conrm this result.
How does our paper relate to previous explanations of the Asian crisis? While our
focus on the role of uncertainty is unique, our empirical results are broadly consistent with
the prevailing idea of the Asian crisis as rooted in the nancial conditions of the corporate
and banking sectors. Indeed, this is probably the reason why GDP growth forecasts are the
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best measure of exchange rate fundamentals in our sample, proving to be empirically superior
to forecasts of other macroeconomic variables (such as ination or the current account) that
have played a key role in other crisis episodes. The statistically signicant coe¢ cient of the
interaction between U.S. interest rates and short-term external debt, which we also nd, is
consistent with the role of internationally illiquid banks emphasized by Chang and Velasco
(2001) as well as with that of foreign currency borrowing by domestic rms in the model of
Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2004). Our paper, however, cannot be seen as a direct
empirical test of these models, which are characterized by multiple equilibria. Developing
a framework for testing the role of uncertainty in models with multiple equilibria is a topic
for future research, possibly using regime switching econometric techniques as in Jeanne and
Masson (2000).
Future empirical research is also needed to verify whether data on other well-known
currency crises in Latin America and Europe conrm the statistical signicance of uncertainty
about fundamentals. In addition, it might be worthwhile exploring whether these variables
can enhance the predictive power of early warning systems, which are often based on past
fundamentals. Indeed, drawing on a previous version of our paper, Bannier (2006) applies
our empirical framework to Mexican data obtaining qualitatively similar results and Köhler
(2007) uses it to explore the role of uncertainty about fundamentals in sudden stops.
Appendix
A A simple rst-generation model
In this section we show that the basic equations of rst-generation models can be collapsed
into equation (2). First-generation models are based on the following core set of assumptions:
mt   pt = a+ byt   cit (4)
pt   pt = et (5)
Et(et+1) = et + it   it (6)
mt = ln (Rt +Dt) (7)
wheremt, yt and pt represent the logarithms of domestic money stock, income, and prices; a, b,
and c are positive constants; et is the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate, dened as units
of domestic currency for one unit of foreign currency; it is the domestic nominal interest rate;
Et is the expectation operator conditional on the information at time t; Dt and Rt denote
the stocks of domestic credit and international reserves; and an asterisk identies foreign
variables. Equations (4), (5) and (6) respectively represent the money market equilibrium
condition, the purchasing power parity, and the uncovered interest parity.
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Equations (4)-(6) can be rearranged into the standard forward-looking exchange rate
equation:
(1 + c) et   cEt (et+1) = mt + vt , (8)
where vt  cit a byt pt denotes an "all-inclusive" velocity term. We also write ft  mt+vt,
where ft gathers the fundamentals that determine the behavior of the exchange rate. Clearly,
an increase in ft would correspond to a deterioration in the fundamentals: in other words, a
larger ft causes a depreciation of the equilibrium exchange rate.
If the exchange rate were free to uctuate, we could determine its equilibrium value by
solving the di¤erence equation (8), thereby obtaining:
et =
1
1 + c
+1X
j=0

c
1 + c
j
Et (ft+j) . (9)
We also assume that public authorities keep the exchange rate xed at a given peg e until
their international reserves are larger than some lower bound R 2 R, while at Rt = R they
abandon the peg leaving the exchange rate free to uctuate.
Dene the logarithm of money stock after a devaluation as mt = ln (R+Dt). Anal-
ogously, denote with ft the fundamentals after a devaluation (i.e. ft = mt + vt). The
equilibrium exchange rate conditional on a successful attack (the so-called shadow exchange
rate), can be obtained by plugging ft into equation (9); namely:
et = 1
1 + c
+1X
j=0

c
1 + c
j
Et

ft+j

. (10)
Let us assume that fundamentals follow the random process: ft = y + ft 1 + t, with
y > 0 and with t being the realization of the random variable: t  Norm (0; 1=). This
stochastic process implies that fundamentals deteriorate over time, as a result of, e.g., excess
growth in the velocity term or in the domestic credit. In order to keep the peg xed at
the value e while ft grows, public authorities have to adjust Rt so that the money market
equilibrium condition (4) continues to hold. Taking expectations, we obtain Et

ft+j

=
jy + ft and, plugging this average into equation (10), we nd: et = cy + ft.
The probability of a speculative attack, Pr (et+1  e), becomes: Pr (t+1  lt), where
lt = e   y (1  c)   ft. Note that, to maintain notation consistency with Section 2.1, it is
enough to dene dene t = y  t, so that its distribution is t  Norm(y; 1=) and where
a larger t means better fundamentals. With this notation change, the time-t probability of
a speculative attack is Pr (t  kt) (i.e. equation (2)), where kt = y   lt.
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B Thresholds values of Proposition 2
Morris and Shin (2004) and Hellwig (2002) show that the trigger points  and x solve:
0 =    
hp
 (x   )
i
0 = D  
p
+ 

   
+ 
y   
+ 
x

  t . (11)
If   22 , the system (11) yields a unique solution (even though it is not in a closed form).
The share of speculators attacking the currency is: Pr(Xi  x j ) = 
p
 (x   ); hence:
dPr(Xi  x j )
d
=
p
  
hp
 (x   )
i
 dx

d
, (12)
where  is the pdf of the standard normal distribution. Therefore, the share of attackers and
the equilibrium trigger point x have the same threshold. By di¤erentiating the equations in
the system (11), it is easy to nd that dx

d  0, y > s1, where
s1 =
+ 
+ 2
 +

+ 2
x ,
which shows that the threshold s1 is a weighted average of the equilibrium trigger points x
and  (see Prati and Sbracia, 2002, for details).
Computing the derivative of the share of attackers with respect to  is somewhat more
cumbersome. Clearly:
dPr(Xi  x j )
d
= 
hp
 (x   )
i

p

dx
d
+
x   
2
p


. (13)
Thus, the share of attackers and the equilibrium trigger point x now have di¤erent thresholds.
In particular, the share of attackers is decreasing in  if  > s2, where
s2 = 2
dx
d
+ x ,
with:
dx
d
=

p
 + 0
2 (+ )0
y   2
p
 + 
p
   20
2 (+ )0
x +

2
,
and with 0 denoting 
p
 (x   ). Analogously, the equilibrium trigger point is increasing
in  if y > s3, where
s3 =
A+ C
A+B
x +
A  C
A+B
 ,
with A = 
p
, B = 0, and C = 
p
 + 
p
   20; thus, s3 is a linear combination of
x and  (again, Prati and Sbracia, 2002, contains the algebraic details).
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C Interpreting the forecasts
In this section, we show that, under general assumptions on how forecasters make their pre-
dictions, the mean forecast measures expected fundamentals and the variance of the forecasts
is increasing in the variance of public and private information.
Consistently with Section 2, the variable   Norm(y; 1=) describes fundamentals,
and each agent i receives a private signal xi =  + "i, with "i  Norm(0; 1=) ("i and "j
independent given  for i 6= j). Bayesian updating implies:
 j xi s N

y + xi
+ 
;
1
+ 

.
Let us assume that each agent i reports to Consensus Economics the mean of his ex-post
beliefs (honest forecasting): fh;i (xi) = (y + xi) = (+ ). The mean of the individual
forecasts of n forecasters then is:
fh(x1; :::; xn) =
P
fh;i (xi)
n
=

+ 
y +

+ 
P
xi
n
. (14)
Given , for n that goes to +1 this random variable converges to:
h () = E [f
e(X1; :::; Xn) j ] = 
+ 
y +

+ 
 . (15)
If n is su¢ ciently large, by using the mean forecast in the empirical analysis we use a variable
that is inuenced by  and y. Since E () = y, then E [h ()] = y. Thus, on average the
mean of individual forecasts is identically equal to the public signal y and does not depend
on  and . Similarly, in our empirical work we expect that, along the time-series dimension,
the mean of individual forecasts does not depend in any systematic way on  and .
Equations (14) and (15) show that the mean forecast is an unbiased but imprecise
measure of y. It is a¤ected by a sample error, due to the fact that we observe only a nite
number of forecasters (as apparent from equation (14)). Even absent the sample error (i.e.
for n ! +1), however, it would still be a¤ected by a forecast error, as shown by the fact
that equation (15) can be rewritten as h () = y + ", where " = (   y)= (+ ). These
considerations, then, corroborate the importance of using IV estimates in our analysis to
address this measurement problem.
Let us now turn to the variance of the individual forecasts:
s2h(x1; :::; xn) =
2
(+ )2
P
(xi   x)2
n
, (16)
where x = n 1
P
xi. Given the fundamental , for n that goes to +1 this random variable
converges to:
2h () = E

2h(X1; :::; Xn) j 

=

(+ )2
. (17)
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For n su¢ ciently large, a change in y a¤ects the mean of the individual forecasts h but does
not a¤ect their variance 2h, which only depends on  and .
Besides the measurement problem due to the sample error shown by equation (16), it
is apparent from equation (17) that while an increase in  always implies a decrease in 2h,
an increase in  does not necessarily reduce 2h. This result is easily explained. On the one
hand,  tends to reduce 2 as it decreases the dispersion of the messages xi. On the other
hand, for given messages xi, the rise in  increases the weight of the private messages in the
individual predictions, making them more heterogeneous among the forecasters. The rst
(second) e¤ect dominates when  >  ( < ).
Honest forecasting corresponds to the forecastersoptimal strategy when their payo¤s
depend solely and symmetrically on the accuracy of their predictions (i.e., when the payo¤ is
of the type: a  j   fh;i (xi)jb, for a < 0 and b > 0). Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006) consider
two other possible strategic objectives of forecasters: a winner-take-all contest, in which the
forecaster whose prediction turns out to be closest to the fundamental wins a prize, and a
reputational-cheap-talk game, an incomplete information game in which forecasters want to
signal that they are the best informed type. These two games share the following properties:
(i) on average, the mean forecasts is equal to the expected fundamental y (as for honest
forecasting); (ii) the variance of the forecasts is always a monotonic function of the variances
of public and private information. Note that a key result from both these strategies is that
property ( ii) holds for any  and ; in particular, it holds also in the case  < .24
It is not necessary to place any restriction on  and  to grant that property (ii)
holds also for a number of other possible forecasting strategies, such as maximum likelihood
forecasting or if information is only public. For the latter case, which is consistent with the
rst-generation model of Section 2.1, Laster, Bennet, and Geoum (1999) show that agents
equilibrium forecasts always di¤er (even if their information set is the same) and their distri-
bution matches the distribution of .
Thus, besides the case of honest forecasting, the condition  >  is not necessary for
the variance of the forecasts to be increasing in the variance of public and private information.
Nonetheless, we can attempt an estimate of the relative values of  and  to check whether
 > . Specically, we can regress the mean forecasts of GDP growth on actual GDP growth
and a constant. By equation (15), the slope of this regression, which we denote by ^1,
provides an estimate of = (+ ). This is just a rough estimate of the order of magnitude
24 If agents use a convex forecast strategy of the kind: fp;i (xi) = [1  P (; )]  y + P (; )  xi, with
P (; ) 2 (0; 1), it is immediate to check that property (i) always holds. For the variance of the forecasts
to be increasing in the variances of public and private information, instead, some restrictions on the weight
P (; ) are required. Specically, one needs: (a) @P (; ) < 0: i.e. if public information are more precise,
the weight assigned to the public signal must increase; and (ii) @P (; ) < P (; ) 1: i.e. if private
information are more precise, the weight placed on the private signal can increase (the condition is consistent
with @P (; ) > 0), but "not too quickly."
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of = (+ ), because this regression implicitly assumes that this ratio is constant over time.
Interestingly, we nd that the value of ^1 depends on the forecast horizon, and increases as
the forecast horizon shortens. With the 12-month forecast horizon used in this paper, we
reject the hypothesis ^1 < 0:5 (i.e.  < ) for 4 out of 6 countries, while for Hong Kong and
Singapore we obtain values of ^1 in the order of 0.2. These results are conrmed when we
replace the mean with the median forecast as the dependent variable.25
D Additional robustness checks
Additional forecast and actual data. In the specication search, we did not limit our
analysis to forecasts of GDP growth. We experimented with other forecasts of macroeconomic
variables from Consensus Economics  ination, current account balance, trade balance, and
exports  but these variables did not perform as well as GDP growth and, when we included
measures of the mean and variance of expected GDP growth in the regression, hardly any
other forecast variable was signicant. This is not surprising once we recall that imbalances
in the nancial and corporate sectors are believed to be at the root of the Asian crisis and
note that the economic conditions of these sectors are more likely to be reected in GDP
growth forecasts than in forecasts of other macroeconomic variables.
We also considered other regressors from actual, rather than forecast, data. A non-
exhaustive list we experimented with includes: GDP growth, ination, international reserves,
and the ratio of M2 to international reserves. However, none of these variables had a signif-
icant e¤ect on exchange rate pressures once we included the mean and variance of expected
GDP growth in the regression. In particular, when we tried actual GDP growth  whose in-
clusion in the empirical model would have potentially allowed to attenuate the measurement
problem, since equation (15) shows that the mismeasurement depends on actual fundamen-
tals  this variable was not signicant while ^1 and ^2 remained signicant and with the
predicted sign.
Robustness to dynamic specication and endogenous regressors. As it is com-
mon in the literature, when we test the global-game model we exploit time-series information
to test an essentially static game, implicitly assuming that the data come from a myopic,
repeated play of the one-shot game. To be consistent with this approach, we have corrected
for serial correlation of the errors in our regressions by including a country-specic AR(1)
term rather than estimating a truly dynamic specication. In a possible dynamic extension
of the theory, speculators would use information revealed in previous stages of the game to
decide whether to attack the currency in the current period. While developing a dynamic
version of the global-game model is beyond the scope of this paper, we can estimate a dy-
25We thank a referee both for pointing out the measurement problem a¤ecting the mean forecast and for
suggesting this regression.
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namic version of equation (3) with the lagged exchange rate pressure index on the right-hand
side, implicitly assuming that the information on exchange rate pressures in the previous
month is available to speculators at the beginning of the following month. Estimating this
specication with SUR methodology yields results very similar to those reported in Table 2
conrming, in particular, sign and statistical signicance of all coe¢ cients.
To correct for the possible bias due to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable
among the regressors, we also estimate a dynamic panel version of our model using the GMM
estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) with additional lags of the dependent variable as
instruments. The Sargans test of overidentifying restrictions and Arellano and Bonds test
for (second order) residual autocorrelation conrm the validity of these instruments. The
GMM estimates are in line with previous results: ^1 and ^2 have the same signs as in the
baseline regression and are both statistically signicant at the 1 percent condence level.
The GMM estimator provides also an alternative way of checking for the robustness of
our results to the potential endogeneity of the one-period-lagged mean and variance of the
forecasts by instrumenting them with additional lags of the same variables and verifying the
validity of these instruments with tests of overidentifying restrictions and residual autocorre-
lation. The GMM estimates easily pass these tests and conrm the signs and signicance of ^1
and ^2 obtained with the baseline specication and the SUR estimation technique. Allowing
for country-specic coe¢ cients in the GMM estimates does not change these results.
Time-varying ^1 and ^2. Another robustness check regards the possible instability
over time of ^1 and ^2. Proposition 2 implies that the e¤ect of expected fundamentals
on exchange rate pressures is always negative but may vary over time with the precision of
public and private information. We allow for this possibility by estimating ^1 recursively with
state-space techniques. We nd that ^1 varies within a relatively narrow range, remaining
always negative and strongly signicant. Similarly, the e¤ect of uncertainty on exchange rate
pressures may vary depending not only on the level of expected fundamentals (for which we
control), but also on whether it is the precision of public or private information that changes
and on the di¤erence between the actual fundamental  and the cuto¤point x. In particular,
there may be instances in which changes in the precision of private information may cause
the parameter ^2 to turn negative. We check this possibility by estimating ^2 recursively
nding that the recursive estimate of ^2 changes over time but remains always positive and
signicantly di¤erent from zero.26
Time-varying threshold ^. The last robustness check is the estimation of the thresh-
olds separating high from low expected GDP growth. These are also likely to be time-varying,
26We also estimated separate recursive coe¢ cients ^2;j for each country. Because of the smaller number
of observations, the country-specic estimates had larger RMSE bands at the beginning of the period. The
estimated coe¢ cients were, however, mostly positive with a statistically signicant negative coe¢ cient only
for the early part of the Hong Kong sample.
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reecting changes in the parameters in kt, s1, and s2 in the models of Section 2 or, for in-
stance, because investors might have simply revised estimates of potential growth rates as
the crisis progressed. To address this potential concern, we estimate the six parameters ^j in
(3) recursively. In all countries except Hong Kong, the estimated thresholds tend to decline
until end-1997 before rebounding and stabilizing below their pre-crisis level. Nevertheless,
allowing for time-varying thresholds has little e¤ect on ^1 and ^2, which remain signicant
and with the predicted sign. The overall estimated e¤ect of eGDPj ;t 1 on exchange rate pres-
sures (measured by ^2 (feGDPj ;t 1  ^jGDP;t 1)) may also vary with changes in GDP forecasts
(feGDPj ;t 1) and country-specic thresholds (^jGDP;t 1). We nd that this estimated e¤ect
varies substantially over time but remains mostly positive, with the exception of Indonesia
in 1998-99 and Singapore at end-1998.
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Table 1.  Values of the index of exchange rate pressure for different levels of the average and 
variance of GDP growth forecasts ¹ 
 
"Bad" average forecast "Good" average forecast 
High forecast variance 
(obs) 
 
 
-0.157 
(259) 
 
 
0.797 
(113) 
 
 
Low forecast variance 
(obs) 
 
 
0.348 
(113) 
 
-0.163 
(259) 
¹ The average forecasts is "bad" ("good") if it is below (above) the country's median GDP growth forecast; the 
forecasts variance is high if it is above (below) the median sample value. The index of exchange rate pressure is the 
sum of the normalized values of: (i) the percentage depreciation of the domestic currency against the U.S. dollar over 
the previous month; (ii) the fall in international reserves over the previous month as a percentage of the 12-month 
moving average of imports; and (iii) the three-month interest rate less the annualized percentage change in consumer 
prices over the previous six months (see Section 3.1). 
 
  
Table 2.  Exchange Rate Pressure (IND3  Index) Estimates 
(SUR estimates; standard errors in parenthesis; sample: 1995:03 - 2005:04)¹ 
  Thailand Indonesia South Korea Malaysia Singapore Hong Kong Panel² 
                
0, jγ    -3.130 -2.232 *   -12.807 *** -8.517 *** -10.446 *** 4.962 * Fixed effects: 
   (2.477)   (1.238)   (3.171)   (2.356)   (3.212)     (2.571) YES 
        
1γ  -0.361 *** -1.426 *** 
                                                            (0.082)    (0.313) 
        
2γ  0.633 *** 2.803 *** 
                                                            (0.067)   (0.890) 
        
3γ                                                              0.025    -0.323 
                                                           (0.064)    (0.331) 
        
4γ *1000 0.441 *** 1.035 *** 
                                                     (0.104)   (0.345) 
        
j
γ  2.508 *** 0.469     1.661 4.078 ***    1.024   -0.947    7.310 *** 
  (0.746) (0.777)   (1.129)  (1.044)   (0.957)   (1.223)   (0.350) 
        
5, jγ    0.057 * 0.041 *** 0.163 *** 0.114 *** 0.111 ***   -0.044 *    -0.029 
  (0.029)  (0.015)    (0.036)   (0.025)    (0.032)   (0.025)    (0.032) 
        
        
jρ  0.334 *** 0.381 *** 0.500 *** 0.460 *** 0.203 *** 0.189 ** 0.248 *** 
  (0.074)  (0.088)    (0.079)   (0.069)    (0.072)    (0.083)   (0.071) 
        
2R  0.357 0.698 0.557 0.424 0.108 0.377 0.329 
        
DW 1.678 2.142 1.568 1.872 1.784 2.157 2.050 
        
Observations 123 123 123 123 123 123 180 
                
¹ Data are monthly.  Three (***), two (**) and one (*) stars mark statistical significance respectively at one, five, 
and ten percent levels.  ²The panel sample is 1995:03 - 1997:07.  Panel Durbin-Watson statistics are calculated using 
the within residuals as suggested by Bhargava et al. (1982). 
Standard Errors for 
j
γ  are calculated using the delta method. 
 
  
Table 3.  Exchange Rate Pressure (IND3 Index) Estimates 
(3SLS estimates using United States consumption instruments; standard errors in parenthesis; 
sample: 1995:03 - 2005:04)¹ 
  Thailand Indonesia South Korea Malaysia Singapore Hong Kong Panel² 
                
0, jγ  -2.639    0.280 -22.682 ***   -5.344 * -5.422  7.712 *** Fixed Effects: 
 (3.179)   (1.563)    (5.790)   (2.751) (3.600)    (2.687) YES 
        
1γ  -0.472 ***    -1.928 *** 
                                                              (0.125)   (0.488) 
         
2γ  0.788 ***    4.537 *** 
                                                             (0.105)   (1.327) 
        
3γ  0.128 *    -0.298 
                                                             (0.068)    (0.393) 
         
4γ *1000 0.345 ***    0.832 * 
                                                     (0.105)   (0.431) 
        
j
γ     1.785 *    2.006 *    2.765     4.329 ***    0.906    -2.477 *    7.013 *** 
   (0.960)   (1.130)   (1.925)    (1.301)   (1.131)   (1.371)   (0.328) 
        
5, jγ     0.048    0.017    0.285 *** 0.082 *** 0.060 * -0.079 ***   -0.049 
   (0.037)  (0.017)   (0.063)  (0.028)     (0.036)   (0.026)   (0.039) 
        
        
jρ  0.444 *** 0.356 ***    0.833 ***    0.496 ***    0.265 ***    0.099 0.351 *** 
  (0.087)  (0.094)   (0.065)   (0.080)   (0.086)   (0.089)   (0.081) 
        
2R  0.366 0.683 0.584 0.433 0.112 0.378 0.332 
        
DW 1.898 2.154 1.939 2.039 1.922 1.990 1.969 
        
Observations 123 123 123 123 123 123 180 
        
¹ Data are monthly.  Three (***), two (**) and one (*) stars mark statistical significance respectively at one, five, 
and ten percent levels.  ²The panel sample is 1995:03 - 1997:07.  Panel Durbin-Watson statistics are calculated using 
the within residuals as suggested by Bhargava et al. (1982). 
Standard Errors for 
j
γ  are calculated using the delta method.  
 
  
Table 4.  Exchange Rate Pressure (IND3 Index) Estimates 
(3SLS estimates using United States unemployment instruments; standard errors in parenthesis; 
sample: 1995:03 - 2005:04)¹ 
  Thailand Indonesia South Korea Malaysia Singapore Hong Kong Panel² 
                
0, jγ    -2.763   -0.855 -24.861 ***   -5.425 *   -5.021    6.918 ** Fixed effects: 
   (3.222)   (1.463)    (5.729)   (2.793)   (3.632)   (2.776) YES 
           
1γ  -0.384 ***    -2.254 *** 
                                                           (0.125)   (0.457) 
           
2γ  0.738 ***    5.487 *** 
                                                          (0.105)   (1.301) 
           
3γ  0.096 ***   -0.245 
                                                          (0.068)   (0.411) 
           
4γ *1000 0.332 ***    0.658 
                                                          (0.109)   (0.450) 
           
j
γ     1.294    1.031    2.021    4.034 ***    0.043   -3.360 **    6.943 *** 
   (1.067)   (1.111)   (2.144)   (1.453)   (1.390)   (1.613)   (0.246) 
               
5, jγ     0.044    0.023    0.304 ***    0.078 *** 0.050 -0.075 *** -0.063 
   (0.038)   (0.016)   (0.062)   (0.029) (0.036)   (0.027) (0.041) 
               
               
jρ  0.447 *** 0.336 *** 0.850 ***   0.500 *** 0.261 ***    0.117 0.370 *** 
  (0.088)   (0.093)    (0.060)  (0.080)  (0.086)   (0.089)    (0.081) 
               
2R  0.367 0.699 0.588 0.440 0.101 0.364 0.329 
               
DW 1.913 2.145 1.932 2.067 1.923 2.003 2.006 
               
Observations 123 123 123 123 123 123 180 
                
¹ Data are monthly.  Three (***), two (**) and one (*) stars mark statistical significance respectively at one, five, 
and ten percent levels.  ²The panel sample is 1995:03 - 1997:07.  Panel Durbin-Watson statistics are calculated using 
the within residuals as suggested by Bhargava et al. (1982). 
Standard Errors for jγ  are calculated using the delta method. 
 
  
Table 5.  Exchange Rate Pressure (IND3 Index) Estimates 
(3SLS estimates using G6-composite consumption instruments; standard errors in parenthesis; 
sample: 1995:03 - 2005:04)¹ 
  Thailand Indonesia South Korea Malaysia Singapore Hong Kong Panel² 
                
0, jγ    -2.954    0.040 -22.864 ***   -5.503 **   -5.101    7.709 *** Fixed effects: 
   (3.211)   (1.558)    (5.769)   (2.771)   (3.614)   (2.689) YES 
           
1γ  -0.484 ***   -1.895 *** 
                                                           (0.125)   (0.487) 
           
2γ  0.801 ***    4.433 *** 
                                                          (0.106)   (1.324) 
           
3γ                                                            0.126 *    -0.302 
                                                          (0.068)   (0.395) 
           
4γ *1000 0.3384 ***    0.827 * 
                                                          (0.105)   (0.435) 
           
j
γ  1.724 1.838     2.656 4.198 *** 0.941 -2.381 *    6.952 *** 
 (0.943) (1.096)   (1.882)   (1.282) (1.111) (1.348)   (0.337) 
               
5, jγ  0.051 0.020    0.287 *** 0.084 *** 0.057 -0.078 ***   -0.050 
 (0.038) (0.017)   (0.063)  (0.028) (0.036)   (0.026)   (0.039) 
               
               
jρ  0.448 *** 0.356 *** 0.832 *** 0.497 ***    0.267 ***    0.100 0.357 *** 
  (0.087)  (0.093)    (0.065)  (0.080)   (0.086)   (0.089)   (0.082) 
               
2R  0.366 0.684 0.585 0.433 0.112 0.378 0.282 
               
DW 1.903 2.149 1.938 2.037 1.926 1.993 1.985 
               
Observations 123 123 123 123 123 123 180  
                
¹ Data are monthly.  Three (***), two (**) and one (*) stars mark statistical significance respectively at one, five, 
and ten percent levels.  ²The panel sample is 1995:03 - 1997:07.  Panel Durbin-Watson statistics are calculated using 
the within residuals as suggested by Bhargava et al. (1982). 
Standard Errors for 
j
γ  are calculated using the delta method.  
 
  
Table 6.  Exchange Rate Pressure (IND3  Index) Estimates 
(3SLS estimates using G6-composite unemployment instruments; standard errors in parenthesis; 
sample: 1995:03 - 2005:04)¹ 
  Thailand Indonesia South Korea Malaysia Singapore Hong Kong Panel² 
                
0, jγ    -2.632   -0.550 -23.834 ***   -5.419 **   -5.125    7.165 ** Fixed effects: 
   (3.174)   (1.428)   (5.830)   (2.703)   (3.609)   (2.786) YES 
         
1γ  -0.372 *** -2.107 *** 
                                                            (0.123)    (0.446) 
         
2γ  0.741 *** 4.998 *** 
                                                           (0.097)    (1.261) 
         
3γ                                                             0.102   -0.265 
                                                          (0.068)   (0.386) 
         
4γ *1000 0.315 ***    0.821 * 
                                                          (0.110)   (0.421) 
          
j
γ  1.260    1.150    1.739 4.109 ***    0.207    -3.726 ** 7.040 *** 
 (1.060)   (1.082)   (2.190)  (1.415)   (1.367)   (1.648)   (0.268) 
        
5, jγ     0.041    0.019    0.289 ***    0.077 **    0.051   -0.079 ***   -0.051 
   (0.037)   (0.016)   (0.063)   (0.028)   (0.036)   (0.027)   (0.039) 
         
         
jρ    0.438 *** 0.333 ***    0.830 *** 0.482 *** 0.251 ***    0.122    0.330 *** 
   (0.088)   (0.093)   (0.065)   (0.081)   (0.086)   (0.090)   (0.080) 
        
2R  0.367 0.696 0.587 0.442 0.103 0.356 0.323 
        
DW 1.902 2.145 1.926 2.036 1.906 2.000 1.926 
        
Observations 123 123 123 123 123 123 180 
                
¹ Data are monthly.  Three (***), two (**) and one (*) stars mark statistical significance respectively at one, five, 
and ten percent levels.  ²The panel sample is 1995:03 - 1997:07.  Panel Durbin-Watson statistics are calculated using 
the within residuals as suggested by Bhargava et al. (1982). 
Standard Errors for 
j
γ  are calculated using the delta method. 
 
